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Notes
The Desirability of Pour Over
Legislation
Fourteen states have enacted legislation validating a "pour
over" from a will to an amendable trust. The author of this
Note analyzes the desirability of enacting such legislation
in states, such as Minnesota, where the law in this area is
not clear, and concludes that a "pour over" statute is de-
sirable.
Since 1953, twelve states' have enacted statutes which validate a
"pour over" 2 from a will to a trust and give testamentary effect to
subsequent amendments to the trust.3 For example, the Delaware
statute provides:
Whenever a testator bequeaths or devises property to the trustee of an
inter-vivos trust which is evidenced by a written instrument in existence
prior to the making of the will and identified in the will, and which may
be subject to amendment, modification or revocation, the property so be-
queathed or devised, unless the will provides otherwise, shall be governed
by the provisions, effective at the testator's death, of the instrument
1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 111 (Supp. 1958); Fla. Laws 1959, ch. 59-57; ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 194a (1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-601(j) (1953); Md. Laws
1959, ch. 612; Miss. CODE ANN. § 661.5 (Supp. 1958); MoNT. REv. CODEs ANN. §
91-321 (Supp. 1959); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-1806 (Supp. 1957); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 31-47 (Supp. 1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-71.1 (Supp. 1958); Wis. STAT. §
231.205 (1957); Wyo. Comy,. STAT. ANN. § 6-310 (Supp. 1957). Connecticut and
Oregon have also enacted statutes on the subject, but to a different effect. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 45-173 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 114.070 (1957); see discussion at
text accompanying notes 46-51 infra. No statutes dealing with pour overs had been
enacted before 1953.
2. A provision in a will adding property to an inter vivos trust is called a "pour
over" provision. See STEPEENSON, DAnFrNG WLS ANV TRUST AGREEmmN'rs, DIs-
rosrrvE PRovIsioNs § 19.1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as STEPH NSON]. Pour over
provisions may also be used to pour over from a will to another will, from a trust
to another trust, and from a trust to a will. See Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118
N.E. 611 (1918); Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888); STEPHENSON,
supra.
3. For example, A creates an inter vivos trust reserving a power to amend and
subsequently executes a will adding property to the trust. Then A amends the trust
to change his beneficiaries. The amendment clearly controls the property held inter
vivos. E.g., Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934)
(alternative holding). However, if the trust amendment is not executed with the
formalities required for the execution of a codicil, an issue arises as to the effect the
amendment should have on the testamentary disposition from the will to the trust.
See Palmer, Testamentary Disposition to the Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50
MicE. L. Rsv. 33 (1951); 1 Scorr, TRvsTs § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited
as Scorr].
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creating such trust as the same may have been amended, even though
any such amendment may have been made subsequent to the making
of the will. 4
Text writers seem to agree that a testator should be allowed to
use the pour over device.5 This device offers several advantages,
the most important of which is that it can be used to "unify admin-
istration and disposition and thus create a complete estate plan." 6
A man can create an inter vivos trust and then substantially in-
crease the corpus of the trust at his death, while retaining the use
of most of his property during his lifetime. The property retained
until death becomes a part of the inter vivos trust,7 thus avoiding
the need for, or the possibility of, two trusts, one inter vivos and
one testamentary.8 Of course, the same objective can be accom-
plished whether the testator pours over from his will to an inter
vivos trust, or from the inter vivos trust to a trust created by the
will. However, by pouring from the will to the inter vivos trust,
the assets held inter vivos do not become a part of the probate es-
tate and thus may not be subject to fees for probate administration.
Furthermore, the inter vivos trust is not likely to be subject to as
frequent accountings as a testamentary trust would be.9 The pos-
sibility of keeping the inter vivos trust assets out of the probate
4. DEL. CoDE. ANx. tit. 12, § 111 (Supp. 1958).
5. For discussions of the problem whether a provision in a will adding property
to an inter vivos trust is desirable, see Palmer, Testamentary Dispositions to the
Trustee of an Inter Vivos Trust, 50 Mica. L. REv. 38 (1951); ScoTr § 54.3; Comment,
Testamentary Additions to the Corpus of an Inter Vivos Trust- Recent Judicial and
Legislative Developments, 57 Mica. L. REv. 81 (1958).
6. See SmPaENsoN 435.
7. However, the Nebraska statute provides that the trust will be a testamentary
trust unless the trustee is a corporate trustee, qualified to do business in Nebraska.
NEB. Rn~v. STAT. § 30-1806 (Supp. 1957). Connecticut has a similar provision. See
CoNN. GrN. STAT. § 45-173 (1958).
8. Sn'mrENsoN § 19.3. Scott raises the problem that a testamentary trust ma be
subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court while the inter vivos trust is subject
to the jurisdiction of an equity court, thus making uniformity of administration ex-
tremely difficult. See ScoTr § 54.3, at 382-83.
9. See Sco-r § 54.3, at 382-83; STEPHENSON § 19.5. However, this problem may be
avoided in some states by a waiver in the will. E.g., Mi-N. STAT. § 525.504 (1957)
provides in part:
When any bequest or devise to a testamentary trustee amounts to more than
$500 and the will contains no express waiver, the representative may not be
discharged until a trustee is qualified in a court of competent jurisdiction and
until proof of the qualification and a receipt by the trustee are filed. (Emphasis
added.)
Having qualified, the trustee must then comply with Mnm. STAT. § 501.34 (1957),
which provides:
Any trustee whose appointment has thus been confirmed shall file with the
clerk of the district court an inventory containing a true and complete list
of all property received by the trustee belonging to the trust estate. There-
after such trustee shall render to such court at least annually a verified account
containing a complete inventory of the trust assets and itemized principal and
income accounts. (Emphasis added.)
estate and of reducing the number of accountings makes pouring
from the will to the inter vivos trust preferable because it avoids
expenses and the resulting decrease in property available to the
beneficiaries.
These pour over statutes resolve three issues. First, they validate
a provision in a will bequeathing property to a trustee to be held
on the terms of an inter vivos trust. Second, they validate the be-
quest even though the trust is amendable or revocable. Third, they
provide that the bequest is to be governed by the terms of the
trust as existing at the time of the testator's death, even though the
trust has been amended after the execution of the will and last
codicil.
This Note will examine these three issues and analyze the prob.
lems involved to determine whether similar legislation is desirable
in states, such as Minnesota, where these issues have never been
raised, but where the pour over device is widely used.10
I. TnrE VADrrY OF A PoUR OvER
In the absence of a statute, a provision in a will bequeathing
property to the trustee of an inter vivos trust has been upheld by
the courts, under the doctrines of incorporation by reference and
independent significance." The doctrine of incorporation by refer-
ence permits a writing, which is in existence when the will is ex-
ecuted, to be considered a part of the will if the writing is identified
by the will and referred to as being in existence, even though it is
not actually copied into the will. 12 The incorporated writing then
controls the testamentary disposition of the property even though
the writing has not been executed in accordance with the formal
requirements of the wills statutes.'3
The doctrine of independent significance permits a court to refer
to facts which would exist even though there had been no will, in
order to determine the meaning of provisions in the will.14 This
10. A diligent search of Minnesota law has revealed no cases dealing with
either a pour over from a will to a trust or an amendment to a trust designated
to receive property through a will. Interviews with Minnesota attorneys, however,
indicate that pour over provisions are widely used and that amendable trusts are
often involved. E.g., Interviews With Trust Law Committee, Minnesota State Bar
Ass'n in Minneapolis, Apr. 18, & Oct. 17, 1959.
11. E.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920
(1935) (incorporation by reference); In re York's Estate, 95 N.H. 435, 65 A.2d
282 (1949) (independent significance). Incorporation by reference and independent
significance are alternative theories used to uphold the pour over. See notes 22-23
infra and accompanying text.
12. AT- NsoN, Wr.rs § 88, at 387-90 (1953).
13. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920
(1935); ScoTt § 54.1.




doctrine is based on the fact that courts must often receive extrinsic
evidence in order to determine the meaning of provisions in a will.
For example, if the testator bequeaths money to those servants in
his employ at his death, the court must first determine who the
servants are before it can order a distribution of the money.15 Since
the testator has the power to change his servants at any time, he
has the power to change the beneficiaries of his will without execut-
ing a codicil. However, because the testator almost certainly em-
ploys his servants for reasons other than making them beneficiaries
of his will, their identity has significance independent of the dis-
position of property by the will.'6 By the same rationale, the iden-
tities of the trustee and the trust agreement are facts of independent
significance.' 7 The trust agreement affects the property held inter
vivos and consequently has significance unrelated to the disposition
of property under the will.
A testator may desire to use incorporation by reference, first, be-
cause it allows him to include in his will a detailed trust agree-
ment without recopying it, and thus prevents any typographical
errors that might occur in the process of reproduction. Therefore,
the testator is assured that the terms of the trust, as set forth in the
original agreement and as set forth in his will, are identical.' 8 If the
trust agreement were erroneously reproduced, a question could
arise whether the testator intended to amend the trust agreement
by his will or to create a new trust agreement. If the latter were
held, the testator could then have two nearly identical trusts, one
inter vivos and one testamentary, being administered separately.
Separate administration would increase administrative expenses,
which would reduce the amount of money available to the bene-
ficiaries. 9
Second, the fact the trust agreement is not set forth in the will
enables the testator to keep the identity of his beneficiaries, and
the amount of their gifts, from becoming a matter of public record.
The will, as recorded, would contain only a reference identifying
the trust and the trustee, rather than the terms of the trust itself.
Since the inter vivos trust agreement need not be recorded, people
who consult the public record to discover the identity of beneficiar-
ies in order to take financial advantage of them cannot ascertain
either their identity or the amount they have received; nor is the
trustee likely to reveal any of the terms of the trust.
20
15. See Metcalf v. Sweeney, 17 R.I. 213, 21 At. 864 (1891).
16. Palmer, op. cit. supra note 8, at 35.
17. See Scorr § 54.3, at 376-77.
18. See STEPHENSON § 19.2.
19. Id. at § 19.3.
20. See id. at § 19.4.
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A testator may desire to have the courts uphold the pour over
on the theory of independent significance because that theory, as
does incorporation by reference, obviates recopying the trust in the
will and enables the testator to keep the identity of his beneficiaries
from becoming a matter of public record.2 In addition, independ-
ent significance provides a theory a court can use to validate a pour
over provision if the requirements of incorporation by reference
have not been fulfilled,22 or if incorporation by reference has previ-
ously been rejected by the court.3
Although the doctrines of incorporation by reference and inde-
pendent significance are sufficient, if adopted, to provide a means
to validate pour overs to unamendable trusts, 24 legislation is de-
sirable to settle the issue in states where it has not been adjudicated.
In Minnesota, for example, with no court opinion directly in point,25
an attorney cannot include a pour over provision without a risk
that it will be held invalid. A cautious attorney might include in
the will clauses reciting the entire trust agreement, with a provision
that these clauses are to take effect in the event the pour over fails.
Thus, in order to protect the testator from failure of his estate plan,
the advantages which could be gained from the use of incorpora-
tion by reference and independent significance are lost.26
II. TBE EFFECT OF AmENDABLITY OF Tm TRUST
The second provision of these statutes, that is, to validate a pour
over even though the trust is amendable or revocable, seems logi-
cally unnecessary. Since the result of the legislation is to give
testamentary effect to the trust amendments made after the execu-
tion of the will, there is no need to say the disposition is valid
even though the trust is amendable. If a trust amendment made
21. See Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 34, 55.
22. Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 55. The requirements for incorporation by
reference are set out in text accompanying note 12 supra.
23. E.g., the New Jersey court adopted the opinion of the lower court, which
had said:
But regardless of what the rule is in New Jersey with respect to the doctrine
of incorporation by reference, and about which there seems to be some con-
trariety of view, I am of the opinion that this bequest is valid. By it the
testator merely added additional property to a trust fund established by him
years before the execution of his will under a valid, active trust and to which
he had, from time to time during his lifetime, added securities. The trust to
which this bequest is added is not theoretical, nebulous, intangible or incapable
of identification, but exists in fact ....
Swetland v. Swetland, 102 N.J. Eq. 294, 140 Atl. 279 (Ct. Err. & App. 1927)(per curiam).
24. For a discussion of the applicability of incorporation by reference and inde-
pendent significance to amendable trusts, see text accompanying notes 30-51 infra.
25. See note 10 supra.
26. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
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after the execution of the will is to affect the disposition of property
by the will, then obviously that disposition cannot be invalidated
on the ground that the trust is amendable. Similarly, even if the
legislature requires a codicil after the trust amendment has been
executed, before the amendment can control the disposition of
property by the will, 27 the fact is implicit that *the amendability of
the trust will not invalidate the pour over.
However, the draftsmen of the various pour over statutes appar-
ently believed there was a need for such a provision to preclude
any confusion that might be caused by the holding in Atwood v.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co.'s In Atwood, the court held that a
pour over provision was invalid because it added property to a trust
in which the settlor had reserved the power to amend. The court
there said:
we are clear that the plan disclosed in the will and the inter vivos trust
together is obnoxious to the statute of wills, falling plainly within the
condemnation of the rule ... [that] "a testator cannot by his will
prospectively create for himself a power to dispose of his property by an
instrument not duly executed as a will or codicil." 29
Since it would be ridiculous for a court in a jurisdiction having one
of these pour over statutes to follow Atwood, inclusion of the second
provision is mere surplusage. However, since the reason for its in-
clusion is known, such a provision probably does no harm.
III. Tim EFFECT OF AMENDING TnE TRuST Ayvr= Tm EXECUTION
OF TIM WIL
The third, and by far the most important, objective of the statute
is to give testamentary effect to the amendments to the trust made
after the execution of the will. This objective is particularly im-
portant because it creates a new exception to the statute of wills.
This provision enables any testator to change the testamentary dis-
position of his property without executing a codicil to his will. He
accomplishes this change by first executing an amendable inter
vivos trust for a small portion of his property, and then executing
his will, which adds all the remainder of his property to the inter
vivos trust at his death. Then, as he changes his mind from time
to time about the manner in which he wishes to have his property
disposed of at his death, the testator may exercise his reserved pow-
er to amend the trust-thus changing his will. The pour over
statutes uniformly require that the trust amendment be in writing;
however, it is not necessary that the trust amendments be attested.30
27. Two states do require a codicil. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45-173 (1958) and
OnE. REv. STAT. § 114.070 (1957) and text accompanying notes 46-51 infta.
28. 275 Fed. 513 (1st Cir. 1921).
29. Id. at 521.
30. See statutes cited note 1 supra.
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Therefore, the testator has the power to change the testamentary
disposition of his property at any time, without complying with the
attestation requirements of the statute of wills.
Prior to the enactment of the pour over statutes, no court had
ever upheld an attempt to pour over to a trust as amended subse-
quent to the will or last codicil.3 Because the amendment was not
in existence when the will was executed, the courts rejected the
idea that a trust amendment made after the execution of the last
codicil to the will could be incorporated by reference. For example,
in President & Directors of Manhatten Co. v. Ianowit, 32 where the
testator had amended the trust twice after the execution of the will,
the amendments were not given testamentary effect. The court dis-
tinguished Matter of Rausch,33 which had allowed a trust to be in-
corporated by reference, because among other things, "[in Rausch]
the trust agreement was in existence at the time the will was exe-
cuted ... [while here] the fourth supplemental indenture did not
come into existence until approximately two months after the will
was executed."34
Some text writers assert that the trust amendment made after
the execution of the will should control the property added to the
trust by the will because the amendment has independent signifi-
cance.35 They draw an analogy to the case where a bequest is to
servants "in my employ at my death," and conclude that, since the
identity of the servants is a fact of independent significance, an
amendment to the trust also has independent significance. 3 Their
rationale is that when the testator amends his trust, he is changing
the disposition of the res of the inter vivos trust as well as the
31. The testamentary disposition in Matter of Ivie, 4 N.Y.2d 178, 149 N.E.2d
725 (1958), was upheld although the trust had been amended three times after
the execution of the will without a subsequent codicil. However, the total effect
of the amendments was to leave the trust in substantially its original form. The first
amendment added a new trustee; the second amendment 'eliminated the trustee
added by the first amendment; and the third amendment made the trust unamenda-
ble. Id. at 181, 149 N.E.2d at 726. The court said:
To be sure, where the trust remains unimpaired and substantially the same as
it was at the time of the execution of the will, and certainly where the amend-
ments are concerned solely with the administrative provisions of the trust deed,
it cannot be said to come within the purview of the rule against incorporation
by reference.
Id. at 181-82, 149 N.E.2d at 728.
32. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1940).
33. 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
34. 260 App. Div. 174, 179, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1940).
35. See, e.g., Scort § 54.3, at 377; STEPHENSON § 19.7, at 441. The court in
Janowitz rejected independent significance because "the reservation of the power
to amend the trust indenture and its repeated exercise eliminated all independent
significance that might be attached to the trust indenture." 260 App. Div. 174, 179,
21 N.Y.S.2d 232, 237 (1940).
36. See ScoTT§ 54.3, at 377; STEPHmmsoN § 19.7, at 441. See notes 14-17 supra
and accompanying text.
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property added to the trust by the will. Since the property added
inter vivos is affected, the amendment has significance unrelated
to the testamentary disposition. The text discussions generally as-
sume that the creation of the inter vivos trust was designed for
some purpose other than escaping the attestation requirement for
changing a will.y In fact, the writers argue that if the sole purpose
of the trust is to enable the testator to change his will without at-
testation, the trust has no independent significance because it has
no substantial significance unrelated to the testamentary disposi-
tion. s Unlike the case of a man changing his servants, the trust
amendment is quite likely to be designed primarily to change the
testamentary disposition.
The pour over statutes go beyond independent significance when
they allow the trust amendment to control the testamentary disposi-
tion without reference to whether the inter vivos trust has some
other function. However, a legislature considering enactment of a
pour over statute need not find theoretical justification for its action
in such doctrines as independent significance and incorporation by
reference. Yet, there should be some grounds for justifying enact-
ments which so summarily dispose of the attestation requirement
for changing a will.m9
37. See Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 56-58; ScoTT § 54.3.
38. See Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 56-58; Sco-r § 54.3, at 379-81.
39. Professor Scott, the leading exponent of the idea that the trust amendment
should control the property added by the will, can muster no better reason in sup-
port of his view than that a similar result occurs in other situations. The whole sup-
port for his position seems to be:
It is true that the testator is thereby enabled to change the testamentary dispo-
sition without executing codicils to his will. This is, however, what he does
where he bequeaths the contents of a room or of a safe-deposit box, since he
can modify the contents from time to time by removing or adding articles.
The same thing is true where he bequeaths property to persons in his employ
at the time of his death, since he can change the beneficiaries by hiring and
firing.
ScoTT § 54.3, at 376-77. The court in Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. dis-
agreed with Scott:
It seems equally clear to us that this case [a bequest to an amendable trust]
does not fall within the rule which permits a testator to determine to some de-
gee the objects of his testamentary bounty by his own subsequent conduct, as,
or instance, in cases of gifts to servants in the employ of the testator at his
decease, or to surviving partners, or to the persons or institutions caring for the
testator in his last sickness. It is, of course, true that the volition of the testator
as to who shall be his servants or partners, or final attendants, is a factor in se-
lecting the objects of his testamentary bounty. But it is not the only factor. The
volition and acts of such legatees are also factors in determining whether the
designated relationship shall or shall not exist at the time of the testator's
death. There is a practical as well as legal difference between such relationship
* . . and a relationship which arises solely out of the bounty-giving volition
of the testator.
275 Fed. 513, 523 (1st Cir. 1921).
Even if the effect of a gift to servants at the testator's death or of adding articles
NOTES
The reason for requiring witnesses to a will is to prevent fraudu-
lent claims to the testator's property after his death.40 The require-
ment was first enacted in 1676 41 to cope with the problem raised
in Cole v. Mordaunt42 where the decedent's widow paid nine wit-
nesses to perjure themselves by testifying that the decedent had
orally revoked his written testament and had bequeathed all his
property to his widow. Since the policy underlying the requirement
is protection against fraud, before pour over trust amendments
should be exempted from the attestation requirement, it would
seem necessary to show either that there is sufficient protection
against fraud in the execution of a written trust amendment or that
a witnessing requirement would not provide effective protection
against fraud.
The requirement of a written amendment may provide sufficient
protection against fraud in the inter vivos disposition of property.
However, a writing alone does not seem to provide adequate as-
surance that an amendment affecting a testamentary disposition was
executed free from coercion and fraud. More protection is needed
in the testamentary disposition of property because when the valid-
ity of the amendment is most likely to be questioned, after the
testator's death, he will not be available to testify about the sur-
rounding circumstances.
The protection against fraud provided by a witnessing require-
ment probably cannot be quantitatively measured, but that the
protection is necessary can be inferred from the fact that every
state has an attestation requirement for codicils.4" On the other
to a safe deposit box were the same, it does not follow from the fact the attesta-
tion requirement has been dispensed with in these situations that it should be dis-
pensed with for these trust amendments.
40. CAsNER & LE:_cE, CASES AND Tmxr ON PnoPERTY 105-06 (1950). The at-
testation requirement also establishes the identity of those persons who are best
qualified to identify the will and the testators signature, and can testify about
the testator's apparent mental capacity at the time of execution.
41. See Statute of Frauds, 1676, 29 Car. 2, c. 2, §§ 5-6. The only formal re-
quirement of the original Statute of Wills was that the will be in writing. See
Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (repealed).
42. Discussed in Matthews v. Werner, 4 Ves. Jun. 186, 196 n.(a), 31 Eng. Rep.
96, 107 (Ch. 1798). See RmPy & TkEomPNs, HISToRY OF Wrns 9 (1928).
43. E.g., Mnr. STAT. § 525.18 (1957), provides:
Every person of sound mind, not a minor, may dispose of his estate, or
any part thereof, or any right or interest therein, by his last will in writing,
signed by him or by some person in his presence and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or more competent wit-
nesses.
Some states allow unattested holographic wills to be probated. E.g., MISS. CODE
ANN. § 657 (1956) provides:
Every person aged twenty-one years, . . .being of sound and disposing mind,
shall have power, by last will and testament, or codicil in writing, to devise all
the estate, right, title, and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder ...
provided, such last will and testament, or codicil, be signed by the testator or
1959]
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hand, the same fact may only be an indication that the attestation
requirement has become a fixed part of the law, retained without
reason. Whatever the reason for retaining the requirement, it is
clear that the protection against fraud which witnesses afford is
by no means complete. Certainly, if nine people could perjure
themselves, as in Cole, two or three people could attest a counter-
feit codicil and testify that the decedent had executed it. However,
since the counterfeiting would require forgery as well as perjury,
an attestation requirement increases the difficulty attendant to com-
mitting the fraud, and therefore, increases the protection against
fraud.
A legislature facing the issue of whether to enact a pour over
statute, which gives testamentary effect to a trust amendment made
after the execution of the last codicil to the will, must weigh the
protection from fraud against the advantages to the testator of be-
ing able to amend the trust without executing a codicil. These ad-
vantages do not seem to outweigh the need for protection against
fraud. One advantage is that the testator is able to avoid the
inconvenience of executing a codicil. However, in practice, trust
amendments are often witnessed even though the trust is not the
object of a pour over provision in the will.44 Another "advantage"
is that the testator is protected from the forgetfulness of his attor-
ney, who may neglect to execute a codicil after the trust amend-
ment has been made.45 Certainly this last advantage is not a good
reason for enacting a statute which effectively eliminates the at-
testation requirement for testamentary dispositions. Taken together,
the gain to the testator does not seem to outweigh the increased
protection against fraud afforded by a witnessing requirement.
The legislatures of Connecticut and Oregon have enacted stat-
utes46 which require the execution of a codicil after the trust is
testatrix, or by some other person in his or her presence, and by his or her
express direction; and, moreover, if not wholly written and subscribed by him-
sel or herself, it shall be attested by two or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator or testatrix.
44. Interviews With Trust Law Committee, Minnesota State Bar Ass'n in Min-
.neapolis, Apr. 18, & Oct. 17, 1959.
45. The argument has been made that a testator, using a pour over provision,
may have amendments executed by attorneys other than the one who executed the
will, and may forget to tell the new attorney that the trust is the object of a pour
over provision in his will. The problem can be avoided by including in the trust
agreement a statement that the trust is to receive property from the settlor's will.
This statement would alert the attorney that a codicil to the will should be executed
when the trust is amended.
46. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45--173 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 114.070 (1957).
E.g., the Oregon statute provides:
A devise or bequest in a will duly executed pursuant to the provisions of
[ORS chapter 1141 may be in form or substance to the trustee of a trust in
existence at the date of the testator's death and established by written instru-
ment executed prior to the execution of such will. Such devise or bequest shall
[Vol. 44:131
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amended as a prerequisite to permitting the amendment to control
the property added to the trust by the will. These statutes seem to
reflect a determination on the part of the legislatures that the need
for protection against fraud afforded by a witnessing requirement
outweighs the slight inconvenience to the testator occasioned by
the execution of a codicil.
If the trust amendment is invalid because a codicil was not ex-
ecuted, a problem arises whether the testamentary disposition to
the trust should be governed by the terms of the trust as they
existed when the last codicil was executed, or whether the whole
disposition to the trust should fail. 4 7 The Connecticut and Oregon
statutes provide that failure to execute a codicil invalidates the
entire testamentary disposition to the trust.48 Professor Scott for-
merly took a similar position-if the amendment does not con-
trol the property added by the will, the testamentary disposition
to the trust should fail-basing his conclusion on the supposed
frustration of the testator's intention.49 Professor Scott has appar-
ently changed his position, for he now says:
If it is held that . . . [the property cannot pass in accordance with the
terms of the inter vivos trust as amended] should it pass in accordance
with the terms of the unamended trust instrument? It is believed that
ordinarily it should. Presumably the testator would have preferred to
have it so pass rather than to have the testamentary disposition fail alto-
gether. This is the theory which underlies the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. 50
not be invalid because the trust is amendable by the settlor . . . provided that
the will or last codicil thereto was executed subsequent to the time of execu-
tion of the trust instrument and all amendments thereto.
47. See President & Directors of Manhatten Co. v. Janowitz, 260 App. Div. 174,
179, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232, 236 (1940); ScoTt § 54.3, at 377.
48. See CoNN. GCr. STAT. § 45--173 (1958); ORE. REv. STAT. § 114.070 (1957).
49. See 1 Sco-r, TRusvs § 54.3, at 299 (1st ed. 1939). Scott there said:
where a settlor creates a trust inter vivos subject to modification, and by a will
subsequently executed disposes of property in accordance with the terms of
the inter vivos trust as modified from time to time, and thereafter modifies the
inter vivos trust, the testamentary disposition is valid in accordance with the
modified terms. If the only theory on which the testamentary trust is upheld
is that of incorporation by reference, it would seem that the testamentary dis-
position should fail altogether, since the doctrine permits the incorporation
only of an instrument existing at the time of the execution of the will, and it
would defeat the purpose of the testator to have the property pass in accordance
with the original terms of the inter vivos instrument.
Ibid.
Since the purpose of the testator is to have the amendment control the testa-
mentary disposition, either invalidating the bequest to the trust, as Scott suggests,
or allowing the testamentary disposition to be governed by the terms of the original
trust would "defeat the purpose of the testator."
50. ScoTT § 54.3, at 377. Palmer agrees with Scott's analogy to dependent rela-
tive revocation:
In an analogous situation involving the application of dependent relative revo-
cation, courts regularly assume that the testator would have preferred the will
he ostensibly revoked to no will at all. For example, when he cancels one will
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the reason for Scott's dilemma is the futility of at-
tempting to ascertain what most testators would have preferred
had they known the amendment would not control the testamen-
tary disposition. Consequently, the legislatures can do little more
than arbitrarily choose one solution or the other, to take effect in
the event the testator does not express a contrary intention in his
will. 51
CONCLUSION
Legislation is desirable to clarify the law in states, such as Min-
nesota, where the issues involved in the use of a pour over from a
will to a trust have never been decided.52 The legislation should
provide first, that such a pour over is valid; second, that amend-
ments to the trust made after the will is executed do not control
the testamentary disposition unless either the amendment is wit-
nessed by two persons or a codicil to the will is executed; third,
that in the event an amendment to the trust is made, but the
amendment is not witnessed or a codicil is not subsequently exe-
cuted, and the testator expresses no other intention which may be
given effect, the testamentary disposition shall pass by the terms
of the trust as they existed at the time the last codicil to the will
was executed.
Such legislation is preferable because the pour over device pro-
vides testators with a convenient method of disposing of their prop-
erty through an integrated and unified estate plan which controls
both inter vivos and testamentary dispositions.
This legislation would provide better protection against fraud
than would a statute allowing the trust amendment to control the
testamentary disposition even though there was no compliance
with the attestation requirement of the statute of wills. The slight
inconvenience to the testator in having to execute a codicil or hay-
in connection with the preparation of a later will which is not validly executed,
it is held that there was no revocation. The revocation of the first will was in-
tended, the courts say, to be conditioned on the effectiveness of the second. The
underlying assumption is that he would have preferred the first will to intestacy.
Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 62. Palmer also explored the possibility of allowidg
the court to refer to the trust amendment to see which result the testator might
have preferred. He concluded that such reference could not be made because:
the legal basis for such use of the writing despite the statute of wills would
be its independent significance. If a court refuses to find this sufficient for
giving dispositive effect to the writing it is likely that it would also refuse to
consider the writing for the other purpose.
Id. at 64.
51. This is one of those numerous situations in which the testator did not antici-
pate the possible invalidity of any of his attempted dispositions; or if he did, no
provision was made in the instruments to cover the possibility. In such circum-
stances the law must do the best it can.
Palmer, op. cit. supra note 3, at 62.
52. See note 10 supra.
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ing the amendment witnessed seems insignificant when compared
with the increased protection against fraud afforded by the authen-
tication.
A provision that the testamentary disposition should pass by the
terms of the original trust, if the trust is amended without subse-
quent execution of a codicil, is preferable because it would produce
a result consistent with the ordinary result of failure to execute a
valid codicil.
